But the question of legal status becomes almost moot, unless the parties can agree to credible measures that ensure compliance, verification and enforcement of the code. They must also agree on the appropriate institution to oversee implementation of the code and how alleged violations should be addressed.
In the original 2018 draft text, two main proposals were made – to use existing ASEAN-China meetings and working groups related to the implementation of the DOC; or to establish a dedicated commission. In either case, consensus would be required in the event of arbitrating a violation.
WHAT ASEAN RISKS WITH A WEAK AGREEMENT
So it bears asking whether all these outstanding issues can be satisfactorily addressed within one more year.
While not a formal deadline, this inevitably creates public pressures that could pull negotiations in 2027. This could come at the expense of producing a truly effective code, if the overriding objective becomes one of churning out a document to meet a perceived deadline.
A weak code would undermine peace and stability in the South China Sea. Importantly, it could undermine ASEAN’s credibility more than another delay.
This code would be a test of ASEAN’s ability to address thorny security challenges, after being often derided as nothing more than a “talk shop”. A weak code that reeks more of symbolism than substance would validate such criticism.
Collin Koh is senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, based at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

