A SELF-INFLICTED PREDICAMENT
Pakistan’s predicament is largely of its own making. Islamabad has long depended on Saudi Arabia for financial assistance, energy supplies, and employment opportunities for millions of Pakistani workers. The two countries also maintain extensive military ties, with Pakistani personnel historically training and advising Saudi forces.
The pact was therefore a logical extension of an already close relationship, promising to strengthen Pakistan’s economic lifeline and regional standing. But a seemingly low-cost strategic commitment could quickly become a potentially expensive military obligation.
Although the pact commits Pakistan to defending Saudi Arabia, it does not necessarily require offensive operations against the Houthis. Islamabad retains room to demonstrate solidarity while limiting its exposure.
Still, its rhetoric has been forceful. On Sep 29, Pakistan Defence Minister Khawaja Asif declared: “Any enemy of Saudi Arabia is an enemy of Pakistan. That should be very clear.” Such statements reassure Riyadh but raise expectations Pakistan could struggle to meet.
Indeed, Pakistan may already be moving beyond rhetorical support. According to news reports, Pakistani and Turkish military equipment has supported Saudi operations in Yemen, including a recent counteroffensive near Bab el-Mandeb.
Although short of direct combat, this demonstrates how Islamabad’s involvement could deepen without formally entering the war. The distinction between supporting Saudi operations and fighting alongside Saudi forces may become increasingly difficult to maintain.
